RLUIPA:  Where Are We Now?  Where Are We Heading? by Weinstein, Alan C
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Law Faculty Articles and Essays Faculty Scholarship
2004
RLUIPA: Where Are We Now? Where Are We
Heading?
Alan C. Weinstein
Cleveland State University, a.weinstein@csuohio.edu
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_articles
Part of the First Amendment Commons, Land Use Law Commons, and the Urban Studies
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Law Faculty Articles and Essays by an authorized administrator of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact
research.services@law.csuohio.edu.
Repository Citation
Weinstein, Alan C., "RLUIPA: Where Are We Now? Where Are We Heading?" (2004). Law Faculty Articles and Essays. 548.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_articles/548
American Planning Association
Planning & Environmental Law
Vol. 56, No. 2 | p.3
Commentary
RLUIPA:
Where Are We Now?
Where Are We Heading?
Alan C. Weinstein
Over the past three years, hardly a week
has gone by without at least one news-
story announcing that a church, syna-
gogue, or religious school-I'll use the
term "church" from here on as a short-
hand for all houses of worship or other
religious institutions-is claiming that its
right to religious freedom is being
infringed by local government land use
regulations in violation of the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act. RLUIPA, a federal statute signed
into law in September 2000, was enacted
to restore to full vigor legal protection for
religious freedoms that the Act's propo-
nents argue had been seriously dimin-
ished by prior rulings of the U.S.
Supreme Court. Since RLUIUPA went
into law, churches in every section of the
country have challenged zoning, historic
preservation, and eminent domain deci-
sions that they view as obstacles to how
they develop or use their properties.
These challenges have been aided enor-
mously by the litigation support efforts of
national legal defense organizations
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focused on religious freedom-primarily
the Becket Fund in Washington, D.C.,
which has ably assisted counsel for local
churches in dozens of cases.
While some RLUIPA claims are ludi-
crous (e.g., Wisconsin Lutheran College's
unsuccessful claim that complying with
zoning in locating a proposed stadium
would substantially burden its religious
freedom), many disputes pose serious
questions about how we balance the goals
of land use regulations and the religious
mission of churches in the context of a
society experiencing rapid cultural and
demographic change. This article
addresses three basic questions about
RLUIPA: How did we get here? Where
are we now? and Where are we likely
headed?
HOW DID WE GET HERE?
As recently as twenty years ago, neither
churches nor local governments gave
much thought to the federal courts, let
alone federal statutes, when their dis-
agreements about land use regulations
resulted in litigation. Prior to 1983,
church challenges to zoning were nor-
mally brought in state courts, and it was
not until 1993 that Congress first
enacted legislation addressing "religious
freedom." Moreover, just twenty years
ago, neither the First Amendment nor
guarantees of religious freedom in state
constitutions played a critical role in
church zoning cases, which almost
invariably involved attempts to exclude
churches from residential neighbor-
hoods. State courts approached these
challenges under a Substantive Due
Process, rather than First Amendment,
analysis. The majority of states viewed
the exclusion of churches from residen-
tial neighborhoods as a violation of
Substantive Due Process'-because the
moral values associated with churches
outweighed any negative effects they
might have on a surrounding neighbor-
hood-while a minority held such exclu-
sion could be a valid exercise of the
police power so long as churches were
not totally excluded from a community.
1. Pub. L. No. 106-274, codi-
fled at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc
(2000).
2. See the Becket Funds web-
site at
http://www.becketfund.org.
3. See, e.g., Jewish
Reconstructionist Synagogue of
North Shore, Inc. v. Incorpo-
rated Village of Roslyn Harbor,
342 N.E.2d 534 (1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976).
4. See, e.g., Corporation of
Presiding Bishop of Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints v. City of Portenile, 203
P.2d 823, appeal dismissed 338
U.S. 805 (1949).
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Churches today are more likely to be perceived as inflicting
negative effects on neighboring properties. Both new church
construction and older churches . . . tend to be significantly
larger than the churches of earlier eras and seek to use their
facilities more intensively.
Things began to change in 1983, how-
ever, with the first two federal Court of
Appeals decisions involving the zoning of
churches: Lakewood, Ohio, Congregation of
Jehovah' Witnesses v. City of Lakewood and
Grosz v. City of Miami Beach.' Both the
Sixth Circuit in Lakewood and the
Eleventh Circuit in Grosz upheld zoning
regulations against church challenges,
using different variations of a First
Amendment balancing test that weighed
the competing interests of land use regu-
lation and freedom of religion. Over the
next several years, most federal courts
applied the Grosz version of First
Amendment analysis in cases involving
church challenges to zoning ordinances
and upheld the challenged land use regu-
lations unless the facts showed discrimi-
natory application or enforcement against
a particular, and usually minority,
religion.
The Smith Decision and
Congressional/State Responses
In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in
Employment Division v. Smith' that the
First Amendment's free exercise clause
did not warrant "religious freedom"
exemptions from "neutral laws of general
application" for religious practitioners or
institutions. The Smith decision meant
that zoning codes, and other "general"
laws that did not single out religion for
unfair treatment, would, if challenged, be
analyzed under the lenient "rational
basis" test, rather than the extremely
demanding "strict scrutiny" standard.
Smith was promptly denounced by a
broad spectrum of religious and political
groups that sought the aid of Congress to
"restore" the religious protections they
claimed the decision had removed. The
Smith decision also prompted several state
supreme courts to reaffirm the "strict
scrutiny" approach to religious freedom
claims brought on state constitutional
grounds. And since 1990, over a dozen
states have approved statutes or constitu-
tional amendments comprehensively
addressing religious freedom.
Three years after Smith, in Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah,9 a unanimous U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that Smith did not apply to
laws that are "non-neutral"-i.e., where
the law's object is to infringe upon or
restrict practices based on their religious
motivation. But the Hialeah decision did
not abate the efforts of those seeking to
"overturn" Smith, and that same year,
Congress enacted the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA),'o a law intended
to reinstate the strict scrutiny standard
the Supreme Court had abandoned in
Smith. RFRA proved to be short-lived,
however. Four years after its enactment,
the Supreme Court struck down the Act
in City of Boerne v. Flores," ruling that it
exceeded the enforcement powers
granted to Congress under the
Fourteenth Amendment and also violated
fundamental Separation of Powers princi-
ples by allowing Congress, rather than
the Supreme Court, to determine the
meaning of the First Amendment's guar-
antees of religious freedom.
Enactment of RLUIPA
In the wake of the Boerne decision, reli-
gious and political groups again peti-
tioned Congress to enact a religious free-
dom law, albeit one better suited to with-
stand judicial scrutiny. Efforts to enact a
bill similar to RFRA failed in 1998 and
1999. In July 2000, however, two Senators
at opposite ends of the political spec-
trum-Edward Kennedy (D-MA) and
Orrin Hatch (R-UT)-proposed a more
limited bill, focusing solely on land use
and the religious rights of prisoners, that
became RLUIPA. The bill's proponents
claimed that RLUIPA, while still address-
ing the problems raised by Smith, avoided
the constitutional pitfalls of RFRA-a
claim that those who opposed RFRA dis-
puted. RLUIPA quickly gained broad
support, unanimously passed both houses
of Congress before the end of July, and
was signed into law by President Clinton
on September 22, 2000.
A Broader View on
"How Did We Get Here?"
While disputes over the application of
local zoning and historic preservation
ordinances to churches and other "reli-
gious" uses of property are nothing new,
the number and intensity of such dis-
putes appear to have escalated in recent
decades. Several factors have contributed
to this trend. First, churches today are
more likely to be perceived as inflicting
negative effects on neighboring proper-
ties. Both new church construction and
older churches seeking to expand exist-
ing facilities tend to be significantly
larger than the churches of earlier eras
and seek to use their facilities more
intensively. Some congregations today
seek to develop "big-box churches" in
,excess of 100,000 square feet, or "mega-
churches" occupying "campuses" of 20
acres or more. In addition to religious
services, these churches house elemen-
tary and secondary education, child and
senior day-care centers, and banquet
halls; operate adult education classes and
a variety of faith-based "support" pro-
grams; provide shelter for the homeless
and meals for the indigent; and often
have recreational facilities rivaling the
best-equipped fitness clubs, motion-pic-
ture theaters, and coffee shops. As
church activities expand to 12 or more
hours per day, seven days a week, neigh-
bors become increasingly concerned
about the negative effects of increased
traffic, parking, noise, and late-night
activity on property values and lifestyle.
When the church rivals the size of major
commercial developments, the conflict
between church and neighborhood can
12become acute.
5. 699 F2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983).
6. 721 F.2d 729 (11th Cir.
1983).
7. See, e.g., Islamic Center of
Mississippi, Inc. v. City of
Starkville, 840 F2d 293 (5th Cir.
1988).
8. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
9. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
10. Pub. L. No, 103-41, codi-
fled at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 bb -
200bb-4 (1994).
11. 521 U.S. 507 (1997),
12. See, e.g., Jim Schwab,
Faith-Based Planned
Developments: Sorting Out the
Uses, ZONING NEws, June 2003,
and Jim Schwab, Zoning and
Big Box Religion, ZoNING NEwS,
November 1996; Jonathan D.
Weiss and Randy Lowell,
Supersizing Religion:
Megachurches, Sprawl and
Smart Growth, 21 ST. Louis U.
PUB. L. REv 313 (2002).
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RLUIPA's reach is extremely broad due to its expansive definition
of what constitutes a protected "exercise of religion."
Of course, any new or expanded non-
residential development proposed for a
residential neighborhood-the traditional
locale for houses of worship-is likely to
be opposed by neighbors. But this classic
"NIMBY" phenomenon poses additional
difficulties as regards churches because of
recent changes in the manner in which
Americans worship. Whereas previous
generations attended church in their own
neighborhood, commentators have noted
that today, "religious institutions serve
populations that are less and less cen-
tered in the geographic communities in
which they are located." Thus, a pro-
posed church is likely to be seen by its
neighbors as providing them few benefits
(since most of them will not be mem-
bers), while imposing on them the bur-
dens associated with more intense land
uses, such as increased traffic, parking
difficulties, noise, and the possibility of
negative effects on property values.
Finally, the societal debate over the
proper relationship between religion and
government in American society-as seen
in our media, at the ballot-box, and in our
legislatures and courts-may also play a
role in these land use disputes. In all of
these forums, advocates for the strict sep-
aration of church and state argue that reli-
gion deserves no "special treatment"
from government, while proponents of a
larger role for religion in society contend
that government should, at minimum,
accommodate the needs of religious insti-
tutions and practitioners. At the local
level, these differing perspectives can
underlie disputes about the application of
local zoning and historic preservation
ordinances to churches.
WHERE ARE WE NOW?
How RLUIPA Affects Land Use Regulation
RLUIPA affects local land use regulation
by setting forth a "general rule" prohibit-
ing a local government from imposing or
implementing a "land use regulation" in
a manner that imposes a "substantial bur-
den" on the "religious exercise" of a per-
son (including a religious assembly or
institution), unless the government can
demonstrate that imposition of the bur-
den is in furtherance of a "compelling
governmental interest" and is the "least
restrictive means of furthering" that
interest. RLUIPA defines "land use regu-
lation" as a "zoning or land-marking law,
or the application of such a law, that lim-
its or restricts a claimant's use or develop-
ment of land (including a structure
affixed to land), if the claimant has an
ownership, leasehold, easement, servi-
tude, or other property interest in the
regulated land or a contract or option to
acquire such an interest."14
RLUIPA's jurisdiction extends to cases
in which:
* the substantial burden is imposed
from a program or activity that is fed
erally-funded, thus invoking the
Spending Clause of the U.S.
Constitution;
* the substantial burden, or its removal,
affects interstate commerce, thus
invoking the Constitution's
Commerce Clause; or
* the substantial burden is imposed as a
result of land use regulations that per
mit the government to make "individ
ualized assessments" regarding the
use of the affected property, arguably
invoking language in Smith that
authorizes strict scrutiny when govern
ment "has in place a system of indi
vidual exemptions" but "refuse[s] to
extend that system to cases of 'reli
gious hardship' . . . ."
Clearly, given its broad jurisdiction,
the Act potentially could require that
many, if not all, local government land
use decisions affecting churches be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny when challenged.
In addition, RLUIPA contains provi-
sions mandating that local land use regu-
lations must:
* grant "equal treatment" to a religious
assembly or institution;
* not discriminate against any assembly
or institution on the basis of religion
or religious denomination; and
* not impose or implement a land use
regulation that totally excludes reli-
gious assemblies from a jurisdiction or
unreasonably limits religious assem-
blies, institutions, or structures within
a jurisdiction.
The Act does not define the terms
"religious assembly" or "religious institu-
tion," but their differing treatment (the
ban on total exclusion applies only to
"religious assemblies") suggests that
"religious assembly" is the broader term,
encompassing informal religious groups
that worship or study in private homes
and rented facilities.
RLUIPA's reach is extremely broad
due to its expansive definition of what
constitutes a protected "exercise of reli-
gion." The Act first defines this term
generally as "any exercise of religion,
whether or not compelled by, or central
to, a system of religious belief," then sets
forth a "Rule" that "the use, building, or
conversion of real property for the pur-
pose of religious exercise shall be consid-
ered to be religious exercise of the person
or entity that uses or intends to use the
property for that purpose.""
Finally, RLUIPA also prescribes rules
for legal claims brought under the Act.
These include shifting the burden of per-
suasion to local government once a plain-
tiff produces prima facie evidence of a
violation, and providing for the recovery
of attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. §1988.
What's Been Happening in RLUIPA Cases?
About 30 RLUIPA land use challenges
have produced reported decisions. A
number of these, however, have been rul-
ings on motions rather than decisions ren-
dered after trial, and many of these rul-
ings are still under appellate review. The
13. Marc D. Stem, Zoning for
Churches. Guidegans, But No
Magic Formula, 7 RESrCrmSM
COMMUNrry No. 3 at 69, 70 (1997).
14. 42 USCA § 2000cc-5(5).
15. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
16. 42 USCA §2000cc-
5(7)(A)&(B).
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Several RLUIPA decisions . . . have interpreted the Act far less
broadly than its proponents claim is required.
author's weekly searches of Westlaw's
news databases and Internet sources
show that these reported decisions are
just the tip of the iceberg: at least another
30 cases have been filed and many more
lawsuits threatened. The RLUIPA claims
asserted in these complaints and threat-
ened suits have included:
* the right to host large numbers of per-
sons at worship services or prayer
groups conducted regularly in one's
home;
* the right to establish a church or
"social service" religious use in a spe-
cific zoning district where such uses
are prohibited (a claim that has been
made for all district types, from resi-
dential to industrial);
* challenges to regulations that arguably
prohibit "religious uses" while allow
ing other uses that have similar effects
on neighboring areas;
* claims that land use regulations are an
"effective ban" on religious uses; and,
most generally,
* challenges to the denial of a zoning
permit application or an application
submitted under an historic preserva-
tion ordinance.
Local government reactions to
RLUIPA claims have run the gamut, from
immediate unconditional surrender at a
church's mere mention of RLUIPA, to
good-faith efforts at compromise, to will-
ingness-perhaps even eagerness-to liti-
gate the case all the way to the U.S.
Supreme Court. These differing reactions
are partly explained by the facts of partic-
ular RLUIPA disputes, but a critical fac-
tor may also be how familiar local officials
and their legal counsel are with RLUIPA
cases decided to date.
It can be intimidating to local officials
when a church threatens a RLUIPA
claim, particularly when the church is
represented, often pro bono, by prominent
local counsel with expert assistance from
the Becket Fund or other public interest
attorneys. The fact that RLUIPA pro-
vides for an award of attorneys' fees to a
winning church-even when the church's
attorney handles the matter pro bono-
only adds to a city's concern when it faces
a RLUIPA challenge. RLUIPA decisions
to date, however, suggest that such con-
cerns should not be overstated.
Several RLUIPA decisions, including
a recent ruling from the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, have interpreted the
Act far less broadly than its proponents
claim is required. As a result, local gov-
ernments have normally defeated
RLUIPA challenges when they demon-
strate that the restrictions placed on a
church do not target religious uses for dis-
criminatory treatment, are necessary to
achieve valid land use regulatory goals,
and do not force the church to cease reli-
gious worship. Conversely, churches have
prevailed when local government is
unable to meet these same criteria. In
many of these cases, however, courts have
found that the challenged land use regu-
lation violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and did not rule on the RLUIPA claims.
A recent decision of the Seventh
Circuit in Civil Liberties for Urban Believers
v. City of Chicago illustrates both out-
comes. This case involved ongoing zon-
ing disputes, dating back over a decade,
between five religious groups and the
city. The plaintiffs originally sued under
RFRA, claiming that the city's zoning dis-
criminated against churches because it
required them to obtain special use
approvals to locate in zoning districts
where nonreligious assembly uses were
permitted as of right. The RFRA claims
were dropped after Boerne, but in
February 2000, recognizing the validity of
the plaintiffs' constitutional claims, the
city amended its zoning ordinance to
require that all assembly uses in the zon-
ing districts in question obtain special use
approvals, while exempting churches
from having to show that their proposed
use was "necessary for the public conven-
ience." Despite this accommodation, the
plaintiffs subsequently amended their
complaint to include claims pursuant to
RLUIPA. In 2002, the district court
granted the city's motion for summary
judgment, ruling that the February 2000
zoning ordinance amendments had
removed any potential RLUIPA violation.
On appeal, the churches claimed that
RLUIPA's broad definition of "religious
exercise" meant that there was a "sub-
stantial burden" on religion whenever a
land use regulation "inhibits or constrains
the use, building, or conversion of real
property for the purpose of religious exer-
cise." The Seventh Circuit rejected the
claim, arguing that this construction of
RLUIPA's "substantial burden on reli-
gious exercise" language "would render
meaningless the word 'substantial,'
because the slightest obstacle to religious
exercise incidental to the regulation of
land use-however minor the burden it
were to impose-could then constitute a
burden sufficient to trigger RLUIPA's
[strict scrutiny] requirement . . . .""
Accordingly, the court held that, under
RLUIPA, a land use regulation should be
viewed as imposing a substantial burden
on religious exercise only if it "necessar-
ily bears direct, primary, and fundamental
responsibility for rendering religious exer-
cise-including the use of real property
for the purpose thereof within the regu-
lated jurisdiction generally-effectively
impracticable."
The plaintiffs claimed that "the
scarcity of affordable land available for
development" in certain zones, "along
with the costs, procedural requirements,
and inherent political aspects" of the spe-
cial use and other zoning procedures,
imposed just such a substantial burden.
The court rejected this claim. Noting that
such conditions "are incidental to any
17. 342 F.3d 752 (7 th Cir. 2003).
18. Id. at 761.
19. Id.
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The outcome of cases . . . will rest largely on whether the court
reads RLUIPA's "substantial burden" language expansively ... or
narrowly ....
high-density urban land use" and thus
"may contribute to the ordinary difficul-
ties associated with location (by any per-
son or entity, religious or nonreligious) in
a large city," the court found that "they
do not render impracticable the use of
real property in Chicago for religious
exercise, much less discourage churches
from locating or attempting to locate in
Chicago," observing that each of the
plaintiffs had been successful in finding a
location. The court argued that were it to
find a RLUIPA violation based on the
time and expense required to meet land
use permit requirements, then "RLUIPA
would require municipal governments not
merely to treat religious land uses on an
equal footing with nonreligious land uses,
but rather to favor them in the form of an
outright exemption from land use regula-
tions." The court sternly rejected any
claim that RLUIPA mandates such
favoritism: "Unfortunately for Appellants,
no such free pass for religious land uses
masquerades among the legitimate pro-
tections RLUIPA affords to religious
exercise." The court also rejected plain-
tiffs' claims that the special use require-
ment violated RLUIPA's nondiscrimina-
tion provisions, the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment, or the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
While local governments should hail
this ruling, it deserves two-not three-
cheers due to a split on the panel over
the correct standard of review for a
church's equal protection challenge. Two
of the panel's three judges rejected the
claim that equal protection challenges to
land use regulation of churches should be
subject to heightened scrutiny because
such regulation "necessarily implicates
the fundamental right of religious exer-
cise." They cited the U.S. Supreme
Court's well-known Cleburne" decision as
authority. Applying rational basis review,
the majority held that Chicago had not
violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The third member of the panel, Judge
Richard Posner, dissented on this point.
Judge Posner argued that the Cleburne
Court had actually expanded the bound-
aries of rational basis review by using,
and thus authorizing future use of, a
"sliding scale" approach to rational basis
review so that "discrimination against
sensitive uses is to be given more careful,
realistic, skeptical scrutiny by the courts
than discrimination against purely com-
mercial activities." Viewing the churches
in this case as "no less sensitive a land
use than homes for the mentally
retarded" in Cleburne, Judge Posner
argued "When government singles out
churches for special regulation, as it does
in the Chicago ordinance, the risk of dis-
crimination, not against religion as such-
Chicago is not dominated by atheists-
but against particular sects, is great
enough to require more careful judicial
scrutiny than in the ordinary equal pro-
tection challenge to zoning."" Applying
this standard, Posner argued that the
challenged zoning provisions discrimi-
nated against "new, small, or impecu-
nious churches" by making it more diffi-
cult and expensive to find locations they
can afford, and he found no justification
for such discrimination in the land use
goals articulated by the city.
This disagreement between Judge
Posner and the majority on the appropriate
standard of review for a church's equal pro-
tection challenge echoes the larger debate
between RLUIPA's proponents and oppo-
nents. RLUIPA proponents charge that
many land use regulations constitute a
"substantial burden" on the exercise of
religion because they limit or prohibit a
church's proposed use at a specific location,
and also violate RLUIPA's "equal treat-
ment" provision and/or the Equal
Protection Clause because other arguably
similar uses are not so limited. Judge
Posner, of course, would add that potential
unequal treatment is shown, and height-
ened rational basis scrutiny justified, if land
use regulations have a disparate impact on
well-established and well-financed
churches versus "new, small, or impecu-
nious churches."
RLUIPA opponents argue that zoning
codes challenged as restricting or prohibit-
ing churches at some locations/districts nor-
mally provide other locations/districts
where the church's proposed use is
allowed, or perhaps even treated more
favorably than similar uses. They cite, for
example, the numerous codes that allow
churches, and perhaps schools, as-of-right
in residential districts, provided they meet
the standards in the code, while other
assembly uses-e.g., museums, theaters,
meeting halls-are either prohibited
entirely or treated as conditional or special
uses. Arguing that the critical focus should
be on the land use treatment of churches
generally, not merely at the location pre-
ferred by the church itself, RLUIPA oppo-
nents claim that many challenged codes
would withstand either a RLUIPA or equal
protection challenge.
The outcome of cases presenting such
conflicting claims, as shown in the
Seventh Circuit decision, will rest largely
on whether the court reads RLUIPA's
"substantial burden" language expan-
sively, which potentially subjects almost
any locational or use restriction to strict
scrutiny, or narrowly, which limits strict
scrutiny to regulations that make religious
exercise "impracticable" within the juris-
diction generally. Similarly, a court may
apply the Cleburne rational basis test
expansively, viewing all or some religious
uses as deserving "more careful, realistic,
skeptical scrutiny" and skeptically ques-
tioning the rationales underlying the chal-
lenged land use regulation, or narrowly,
deferring to the legislative judgments in
the challenged code so long as they are
not facially irrational.
20. Id. at 762.
21. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S.
432 (1985).
22. C.L.U.B., 342 F3d at 770.
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The only prediction one can make about RLUIPA litigation is
that a RLUIPA case is certainly headed to the U.S. Supreme
Court ....
Viewed thus, the track record for
RLUIPA challenges has less to do with
the specific facts of any given case and
more to do with a given court's interpre-
tation of the statute or parallel guarantees
of religious liberty and equal treatment in
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
From this perspective, the only predic-
tion one can make about RLUIPA litiga-
tion is that a RLUIPA case is certainly
headed to the U.S. Supreme Court for a
ruling on the constitutionality of the
statute, and this will likely occur sooner
rather than later.
That said, before turning to cases that
have ruled on the constitutionality of the
Act, it is worthwhile to note other
reported decisions.
Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington
Township, a Third Circuit decision
involving a Philadelphia suburb, shows
that the Seventh Circuit is not alone in
adopting a deferential stance towards
local land use regulations. KolAmi
involved claims that Abington Township's
zoning laws violated both the state and
federal constitutions as well as RLUIPA.
At issue was the township's denial of the
congregation's request to covert a former
convent for use as its synagogue. The
congregation argued that their rights to
equal protection were denied because
there was no rational basis for the zoning
decision prohibiting their proposed syna-
gogue at this location. The township
argued that the proposed use as a syna-
gogue would create unacceptably high lev-
els of traffic, noise, and other neighborhood
disruptions as compared with the prop-
erty's previous use as a convent. The con-
gregation prevailed on a motion for stIm-
mary judgment, the court finding that the
township's zoning ordinance, as applied to
the plaintiffs, was an unconstitutional
24
denial of equal protection. Analyzing the
congregation's claim under Cleburne, the
district court found that uses "similar" to
the proposed synagogue could be allowed
as a special exception in the zoning district
at issue, and thus the township's refusal to
allow the synagogue was irrational and a
denial of equal protection.
The Third Circuit vacated the dis-
trict court's ruling and remanded for
additional factual findings as to the
compatibility of the proposed synagogue
with the surrounding residential area,
ruling that the district court had erred
because it "overlooked the threshold
step that must be taken under the City
of Cleburne analysis-the court must first
conclude that the two land uses are
'similarly situated."' 5
What intrigued observers about the
Third Circuit's decision was not its dispo-
sition of the case, but rather what it might
signal about the Circuit's then-anticipated
ruling on the issue of RLUIPA's constitu-
tionality in Freedom Baptist Church of
Delaware County v. Township of Middletown
(discussed below). The KolAmi opinion
strongly supported the right of local land
use regulators to make appropriate dis-
tinctions among land uses, including the
decision to exclude houses of worship
from residential areas. Consider, for
example, the following excerpts from the
opinion:
[T]he federal courts have given
states and local communities broad
latitude to determine their zoning
plans. Indeed, land use law is one of
the bastions of local control, largely
free of federal intervention ....
A necessary corollary of the extensive
zoning authority bestowed upon local
municipalities, including the authority
to create exclusively residential dis-
tricts, is the authority to make distinc-
tions between different uses and to
exclude some uses within certain
zones. Indeed, zoning is by its very
design discriminatory, and that, alone
does not render it invalid."
As long as a municipality has a
rational basis for distinguishing
between uses, and that distinction is
related to the municipality's legiti-
mate goals, then federal courts will be
reluctant to conclude that the ordi-
. . 28
nance is improper . . . .
In view of the enormously broad lee-
way afforded municipalities in making
land use classifications . .. it is
strongly arguable that the Township's
decision to group churches together
with schools, hospitals, and other
institutions is rationally related to the
needs of these entities, their impact
on neighboring properties, and their
inherent compatibility or incompati-
bility with adjoining uses.
Finally, we do not believe land use
planners can assume anymore that
religious uses are inherently compati-
ble with family and residential uses.
See, e.g., Megachurches as Minitowns,
NYT, F1, F6 (May 9, 2002). Churches
may be incompatible with residential
zones, as they 'bring congestion; they
generate traffic and create parking
problems; they can cause a deteriora-
tion of pro erty values in a residential
zone....
On November 15, 2002, however, the
district court approved a settlement
between the parties in Middletown, in
which the township agreed to change its
zoning ordinances to comply with
RLUIPA3 and paid the church's $10,000
in legal expenses . The settlement, of
course, put the speculation instigated by
KolAmi to rest for the time being.
Muphy v. Zoning Commission of the Town
of Mifon3 is the only decision to date on
the important issue of home worship.
Here, neighbors complained because up to
40 people attended weekly Sunday after-
noon "prayer meetings" in the Murphy's
23. 309 F.3d 120 (3rd Cir. 2002),
vacating and remanding, Congre-
gation Kol Ami v. Abington Town-
ship, 161 F. Supp.2d 432 (E.D.
Pa. 2001).
24. Congregation Kol Ami v.
Abington Township, 161 F
Supp.2d 432, 436 (E.D. Pa.
2001); see also Congregation Kol
Ami v. Abington Township, 2001
WL 827492 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
(denying plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration).
25. KolAmi, 309 F3d at 125.
26. Id. at 135.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 136 (citing with
approval, Lakewood, Ohio
Congregation of Jehovah's
Witnesses, Inc. a. City of
Lakewood, 699 F2d 303 (6th
Cir. 1983)).
29. Id. at 143.
30. Id. (footnote omitted).
31. The consent judgment may be
accessed on the Becket Funds
RLUIPA website at http://www.
riuipa.org/cases/FreedomBaptist
ConsentJudgment.pdf.
32. Baptists, town settle suit over
zoning law, PHILADELPHIA INOURER,
November 16, 2002, at 62, 2002
WIL 102158328.
33. 148 F Supp.2d 173 (D. Conn.
2001); see also Murphy v. Zoning
Comm'n of the Town of New
Milford, 223 F. Supp.2d 377 (D.
Conn. 2002) (denying defendant's
motion to dismiss).
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Limiting the number of persons at prayer meetings to 25 imposed a
substantial burden on the Murphys' free exercise rights ....
home, expressing concern that the large
number of cars parked on the street jeop-
ardized emergency vehicles' access and the
safety of children playing in a cul-de-sac.
Despite a finding by the town's zoning
officer that cars were not blocking neigh-
bors' driveways, the zoning commission
ruled that such regularly scheduled meet-
ings are not a customary accessory use in a
single-family neighborhood, and issued a
cease and desist order that limited to 25
the number of persons attending the
prayer meetings. The Murphys did not
appeal the order, choosing instead to bring
a RLUIPA challenge.
The federal district court found that
limiting the number of persons at prayer
meetings to 25 imposed a substantial bur-
den on the Murphys' free exercise rights
because it would defeat the purpose of
the meetings (to help those in need,
including the "26th person"), and that
the cease and desist order imposed a
chilling effect on attendance at the meet-
ings. Having triggered RLUIPA's strict
scrutiny requirement, the Murphy court
had little trouble finding that the town
had shown "a compelling interest in pro-
tecting the health and safety of their
communities through the enforcement of
the local zoning regulations." But it ruled
that the limit on the number of persons
attending prayer meetings did not meet
the least restrictive means test, arguing
that the town should have placed a limit
on traffic or on-street parking rather than
the number of meeting attendees.
Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress
Redevelopment Agency3 4 involved a RLUIPA
challenge to both zoning and eminent
domain actions. Here, the court granted
the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the redevelopment
agency from acquiring the church's prop-
erty under eminent domain for commer-
cial development, which would have frus-
trated the church's plans to develop its
property with a new 300,000-square-foot
religious facility. Cottonwood spent a year
assembling an 18-acre site for its pro-
posed facility in a largely vacant 300-acre
area the city had targeted for redevelop-
ment. Churches were a permitted use in
the area, but the City of Cypress rejected
the church's zoning application as incom-
plete because it did not contain design
review studies the city wanted. The city
then adopted a 45-day moratorium on
new permits in the area to allow time to
consider a new redevelopment plan. The
moratorium was subsequently extended
to bar the church's development for at
least two years.
To avoid this bar, the church appealed
the permit denial to the city council,
which found that the requested design
review studies were not required,
deemed the application complete, and
directed staff to undertake a review. But
on February 28, 2002, the redevelopment
agency offered to purchase the
Cottonwood property for $14,583,500.
Cottonwood refused. The redevelopment
agency then determined to acquire the
land by eminent domain and the city
filed an action in state court to condemn
the land on May 29, 2002.
Cottonwood sued in January 2002,
challenging the constitutionality of the
land use decisions made by the agency
and the city, and later amended its com-
plaint to challenge the city's condemna-
tion of its property. After denying the
city's motion to dismiss, the federal dis-
trict court ruled that RLUIPA's strict
scrutiny standard of review governed
Cottonwood's claim because the city's
actions regarding the proposed church
met both the commerce clause and "indi-
vidualized assessments" jurisdictional
bases in the statute. The court further
ruled that even were jurisdiction under
RLUIPA not invoked, strict scrutiny
would still be appropriate under a free
exercise clause analysis because the city's
actions were "individualized assess-
ments" and there was "strong evidence
that Defendants' actions are not neutral,
but instead specifically aimed at discrimi-
nating against Cottonwood's religious
uses."" The court also found that the
city's zoning and eminent domain actions
substantially burdened Cottonwood's
exercise of religion because they made it
impossible for the church "to practice its
36
religious beliefs in its current location."
The court then examined whether the
city had satisfied its strict scrutiny burden
by demonstrating that its actions were sup-
ported by a compelling governmental
interest and were the least restrictive
means for accomplishing that interest. The
city had advanced two interests for refusing
to grant Cottonwood's permit request and
for condemning its property-preventing
blight and generating revenue for the city.
The court quickly dismissed the blight
rationale, questioning whether the city's
twelve-year-old finding of blight was still
valid and arguing that the new 300,000-
square-foot church would have eliminated
any blight that did exist. The court was
similarly dismissive with the city's claimed
interest in revenue generation, noting that
the city has maintained a 25 percent
budget surplus without imposing addi-
tional taxes, and arguing more generally
that by granting too much weight to a
claimed interest in revenue generation,
courts could allow cities to deny land use
37
permits for any not-for-profit entity.
Finally, the court ruled that even if it had
found these interests compelling, the city
had not utilized the least restrictive means
to advance the interests, but rather had
"done the equivalent of using a sledge-
hammer to kill an ant," noting again that
construction of the proposed church would
have alleviated any blight and that "the
City has not demonstrated that there is no
other way to provide for revenue without
taking the property and preventing
Cottonwood from building its church."
34. 218 F. Supp.2d 1203 (C.D.
Cal. 2002).
35. Id. at 1224.
36. Id. at 1226.
37. Id. The Court also noted
that some of the church's activi-
ties would generate sales tax
revenues and that the large
numbers of people attending
the 4,700-seat sanctuary would
create a ready market for sur-
rounding commercial develop-
ments.
38. Id. at 1229.
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orably and fairly quickly to the U.S. Supreme Court.
After the court granted Cottonwood
its preliminary injunction, the church and
the city skirmished back and forth a bit,
but in October 2002, Cottonwood
Christian Center and the city agreed that
the church will sell its land where the city
wanted retail development and will have
the opportunity to purchase 28 acres on
the Cypress Golf Course. Both sides also
agreed to drop their lawsuits as part of
35
the settlement.
In two other California cases, RLUIPA
claimants have been less successful. In
Ventura County Christian High School v. City
of San Buenaventura, a private religious
school sought a preliminary injunction bar-
ring the city from enforcing its zoning
requirements as applied to modular class-
rooms the school sought to erect on land
leased from the public school district. The
court denied the motion, finding that there
was no evidence that the religious school
had been treated unequally in comparison
to secular applicants as regards approvals
for modular classrooms, and that compli-
ance with the approval requirements did
not substantially burden the school's exer-
cise of religious freedom.
In an unreported case, San Jose Christian
College v. City of Morgan Hill, the court
granted the defendant city's motion for
summary judgment against a religiously
affiliated college that had challenged the
denial of its application to rezone a prop-
erty for educational use. Here, the college
had purchased a vacant former hospital
intending to use the property for its college
campus, but the city denied the rezoning
application on the grounds that the prop-
erty was the only site in the city zoned for
hospital use and the college had not com-
plied with the city's rezoning procedures.
The college challenged both the proce-
dural and substantive elements of the city's
zoning code that governed its application
for rezoning.
The court ruled that the RLUIPA
claim failed because the college: (1) pro-
vided no evidence that the city's zoning
code placed undue limitations on reli-
gious institutions, treated them
unequally, or discriminated against them;
and
(2) could not establish a prima facie case
that the city's action imposed a substan-
tial burden on its religious exercise.
While this decision does not elaborate on
the basis for the ruling on the substantial
burden issue, this same court's prior rul-
ing denying the plaintiff's motion for a
preliminary injunction argued that the
proposed use of the property as a college
did not constitute an "exercise of reli-
gion" as that term has been defined in
the Ninth Circuit's case law or as compre-
hended in RLUIPA.
In other reported decisions, courts
have declined to reach, or have not yet
reached, the RLUIPA claim. Some courts
have ruled that the case could be
resolved on other grounds, including the
Free Exercise Clause or state law. In
other cases, the courts found that the
RLUIPA claim was not ripe, 44 or that
strict scrutiny would apply regardless of
the RLUIPA claim, 5 or that the RLUIPA
claim had no jurisdictional basis, includ-
ing where a city did not act pursuant to a
zoning or landmarking law when it
decided to develop a previously dedi-
cated roadway located between two
church-owned lots, or where a neighbor-
ing synagogue was seeking to intervene
in a plaintiff telephone company's chal-
lenge to a city's denial of a permit to con-
struct a transmission tower on a golf
47
course.
WHERE ARE WE HEADING?
Obviously RLUIPA, like its predecessor
RFRA, is heading inexorably and fairly
quickly to the U.S. Supreme Court.
There have already been a number of
federal Courts of Appeal rulings on the
constitutionality of RLUIPA's
Institutionalized Persons provisions,
with the Fourth, Seventh and Ninth
Circuits upholding the Act,4 8 while the
Sixth Circuit held that the Act was
unconstitutional on Establishment
Clause grounds.4 At this date, however,
there are no Courts of Appeal rulings on
the constitutionality of RLUIPA's land
use provisions.
Several federal district court cases
have addressed the constitutionality of
RLUIPA's land use provisions. Freedom
Baptist Church of Delaware County v.
Township of Middletown," Westchester Day
School v. Village of Mamaroneck", a further
ruling in the Murphy case," and United
States v. Maui County all upheld the land
use provisions of the Act, as have several
other less important decisions that will
not be discussed here.5 Elsinore Christian
Center v. City of Lake Elsinore,s" by con-
trast, is the only decision to date declar-
ing RLUIPA's land use provisions uncon-
stitutional by striking down both the
"individualized assessments" and
Commerce Clause jurisdictional bases of
the statute.
These decisions vary in the degree to
which they systematically analyze the
contending positions articulated by
RLUIPA's proponents and critics. To be
fair, the district court judges may have
declined a more probing examination of
RLUIPA in an effort to speed each case
on its way to the Supreme Court, since
that is where the issue of its constitution-
ality must be resolved. For example, all
parties in the Middletown case agreed that
an immediate appeal on the question of
RLUIPA's constitutionality would be ben-
eficial, which allowed the district court to
certify the question of RLUIPA's consti-
tutionality to the Third Circuit as an
interlocutory appeal; however, the parties
reached a settlement before the case
39. Orange County; Cypess,
Church Near Deal in Battle Over
Land, Los ANGELEs TIMEs, October
5, 2002, at B3, 2002 WL 2508473.
40. 233 F Supp.2d 1241 (C.D.
W.D. 2002).
41. 2002 WL 971779 (N.D. Cal.).
42. Fifth Avenue Presbyterian
Church v. City of New York, 293
F.3d 570 (2d Cir. 2002).
43. Martin v. The Corp.of the
Presiding Bishop, 747 N.E.2d
131 (2001).
44. See Hale 0 Kalua Church v.
Maui Planning Comm's. 229 F.
Supp.2d 1050 (D. Haw. 2002)
and State v. Willhite, 2002 WL
452472 (Ohio App. 10th Dist.).
45. Hate 0 Kalua Church, 229 F.
Supp.2d at 1056.
46. Prater v. City of Burnside, Ky.,
289 E3d 417 (6th Cir. 2002).
47. Omnipont Communications,
Inc. v. Oty of Whte Plans, 202
FR.D. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
48. Mayweathers v. Newland, 314
F3d 1062 (9th Or 2002), Charles
v. Verhagen, 348 F3d 601 (7th COr.
2003), Madison v. Rer, 355 P.3d
310 (4th Cir. 2003).
49. Cutter v. Wilknson, 349 F.3d
257 (6 th Cir. 2003).
50. 204 F Supp.2d 857 (E.D.
Pa. 2002).
51. 280 F Supp.2d 230
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
52. Murphy v. Zoning Comm'n
of the Town of New Milford, 289
F. Supp.2d 87 (D. Conn. 2003).
53. 2003 WL 23148864 (D.
Haw.).
54. See cases cited in Maui,
2003 WL 23148864 at 5.
55. 291 P Supp.2d 1083 (C.D.
Cal. 2003).
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RLUIPA's Commerce Clause provision was also upheld in the
Middletown and Mamaroneck decisions, but struck down by the Lake
Elsinore court.
could be argued before the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals.
"Individualized Assessments"
All of these decisions have addressed
both the "individualized assessments"
jurisdictional element of RLUIPA, which
invokes Congressional jurisdiction under
the Enforcement Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the
Commerce Clause jurisdictional element.
The Middletown court dealt with this
issue peremptorily. The court first baldly
claimed, without argument or authority,
that "zoning ordinances must by their
nature impose individual assessment
regimes." Next, after noting that
Congress sought in this provision to cod-
ify the individualized assessments
jurisprudence in Free Exercise cases,
including Smith and City of Hialeah, the
court concluded that RLUIPA "faithfully
codifies the 'individual assessments'
jurisprudence" announced by the
Supreme Court and "is therefore not con-
stitutionally exceptional." Based on that
finding, the court argued that RLUIPA
avoids the infirmities that doomed RFRA
because it narrows its scope to land use
and prison matters and simply tracks the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence on these
matters.
Neither Mamaroneck nor Maui County
presented its own analysis on this issue;
they simily adopted the Middletown
analysis. The Murphy decision, how-
ever, expanded on the analysis in
Middletown. Specifically, the Murphy
court noted that while RLUIPA may
well extend protections beyond what is
mandated by the Fourteenth
Amendment, that extended protection
is within constitutional parameters
because it closely tracks constitutional
guarantees that the legislative history of
the statute show are being violated. It
also noted that the statute is not invali-
dated because its protections may "inci-
dentally capture some conduct that,
although close to the constitutional line,
is not itself unconstitutional.""
In contrast, the Lake Elsinore court
engages in a far more extensive analysis of
whether RLUIPA's "individualized
assessments" provision does nothing more
than codify the Supreme Court's "individ-
ualized exemptions" jurisprudence, and
thus should not share RFRA's fate, and
concludes that it does not. First, the court
correctly notes that the Supreme Court's
"individualized exemptions" jurispru-
dence merely stated that where exemp-
tions from a general requirement are avail-
able, they may not be denied to those
claiming an exemption on the ground of
religious hardship. The court then argued
that "[1]and use permitting is not an anal-
ogous case. In determining whether to
issue a zoning permit, municipal authori-
ties do not decide whether to exempt a
proposed user from an applicable law, but
rather whether the general law applies to
the facts before it."
The Lake Elsinore decision next exam-
ines the two conditions that the Boerne
decision set for an exercise of Congress's
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
powers to be constitutional: "1) Congress
must identify a 'widespread and persist-
ing deprivation of constitutional rights'
which it is acting to remedy or deter; and
2) there must be a congruence and pro-
portionality between the injury to be pre-
vented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end." After calling the
first requirement into doubt by noting
the sparse legislative findings in support
of RLUIPA, the court argues that the
statute also fails the congruity and pro-
portionality requirement because its
broad definition of "religious exercise"
extends strict scrutiny far beyond the
exercise of core religious freedoms that
had marked the Supreme Court's prior
Free Exercise cases.
Commerce Clause
RLUIPA's Commerce Clause provision
was also upheld in the Middletown and
Mamaroneck decisions," but struck down
by the Lake Elsinore court. The contro-
versy over the validity of this provision
stems from recent Supreme Court rulings
that have invalidated Congressional
action as extending beyond the authority
granted under the Commerce Clause.
The concern at the core of the Court's
rulings in these cases is federalism: if not
constrained in some principled way,
Congress could assert its authority "[t]o
regulate Commerce . . . among the sev-
63
eral States," so broadly as "to com-
pletely obliterate the Constitution's dis-
tinctions between national and local
authority."6 4 Since RLUIPA intrudes
deeply and pervasively into local govern-
mental authority, it has been challenged
as exceeding what is permissible under
the Commerce Clause.
In upholding RLUIPA's Commerce
Clause provisions, however, both the
Middletown and Mamaroneck courts
stressed that Congress has extraordinar-
ily broad authority over economic activ-
ity, which includes regulating intrastate
activity based upon that activity's effect
on interstate commerce. The Middletown
court, citing the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, further noted that RLUIPA
was not the first instance in which
Congress had sought to regulate matters
that have traditionally been reserved to
local zoning codes, rather than federal
statutes.
The Lake Elsinore court, in contrast,
argued that RLUIPA's Commerce Clause
provision suffers from a potentially fatal
flaw. "RLUIPA regulates land use law
and not economic conduct. This,
Congress may not do." , The problem
identified here, of course, is that because
every land use regulation arguably has
some effect on interstate commerce, if
RLUIPA's Commerce Clause provision is
56. MIddletown, 204 F.
Supp.2d at 869.
57. Mamaroneck, 280 F.
Supp.2d at 230; Maui, 2003
WL 23148864 at 5.
58. Murphy, 289 F. Supp.2d at
119-121.
59. Lake Esinore, 291 F Supp.2d
at 1098.
60. Id. at 1100, quoting Boerne.
61. Id. at 1101-02.
62. The Murphy case did not
include a challenge to RLUIPA
under the Commerce Clause.
63. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
64. United States v. Morrison,
529 U. S. 598, 613 (2000) (cit-
ing United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 at 564 (1995)).
65. Lake Esinore, 291 F. Supp.2d
at 1103.
American Planning Association
Planning & Environmental Law
Vol. 56, No. 2 | p.12
At minimum, zoning ordinances should provide reasonable
locational options for new, or expanding, houses of worship
and such accessory religious uses as schools.
upheld, there would not appear to be any
principled way to restrain Congress from
extending the Commerce Clause so far
that it destroys the distinction between
what is local and what is national, thus
creating a centralized government.
WILL RLUIPA MEET RFRA'S FATE?
In Boerne, the Supreme Court ruled that
Congress had violated basic principles
inherent in the separation of powers
among the branches of the federal gov-
ernment when it enacted RFRA.
Congress had relied on its broad grant of
power under the enforcement clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting
RFRA, but the Court ruled that Congress
had exceeded that authority by attempt-
ing to alter the constitutional right to free
exercise of religion, rather than enforce it.
RLUIPA, like RFRA, seeks to negate
the effect of the Smith decision and rein-
state the compelling interest test. It differs
from RFRA, however, in two key elements.
First, Congress relied on its power under
the Spending and Commerce Clauses, in
addition to the Enforcement Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, in enacting
RLUIPA. Second, as opposed to RFRAs
extensive reach, RLUIPA is limited to land
use regulation and prisoners' rights. Are
these changes sufficient to yield a different
outcome when the Court reviews RLUIPA?
In light of the Court's concern over the fed-
eralism implications of Congressional enact-
ments under the Commerce Clause that
intrude too deeply on local authority,
RLUIPA appears vulnerable.
CONCLUSION
We are clearly in the midst of a dynamic
environment-socially, politically, and
legally-as regards the role of religion in
our society, and RLUIPA reflects this in
the context of potential conflicts between
churches and land use regulation.
Congress has attempted to empower
churches when they choose where and
how they build a sanctuary or assemble
for worship, and to restrain local govern-
ments when they seek to apply zoning or
landmark regulations to a church when
the congregation objects. The Supreme
Court will, sooner rather than later,
decide whether this attempt is constitu-
tional. In the meantime, how can local
governments seek to avoid RLUIPA
claims, and how do they evaluate their
likelihood of prevailing if challenged?
Avoiding a RLUIPA Claim
Attempting to avoid a RLUIPA claim is
certainly preferable to litigation. Local
governments should examine their land
use regulations affecting religious uses
and how those regulations have been
applied. At minimum, zoning ordinances
should provide reasonable locational
options for new, or expanding, houses of
worship and such accessory religious
uses as schools. While providing such
options may not be particularly difficult
in newer, less-developed communities,
it can be a problem in older communi-
ties that are almost fully-developed.
Such communities may find that their
current zoning effectively precludes
houses of worship from residential areas,
because no sites are available, and also
severely restricts their location in busi-
ness and industrial areas, either because
religious uses are seen as incompatible
in such zones or out of concern for
maintaining the city's tax base. Where
locational options are effectively nonex-
istent or extremely limited, a local gov-
ernment should undertake a planning
study that seeks to determine how it
might accommodate the needs of reli-
gious uses without unduly harming sur-
rounding property owners.
Local governments should also exam-
ine whether they are making adequate
locational options for "social service" uses
such as shelters for the homeless or vic-
tims of domestic abuse and facilities to
feed the homeless and indigent. The
claims of religious institutions that a local
government must allow them to "minister
to the poor" at a location of their choos-
ing is blunted when a zoning code desig-
nates reasonable locational options for
both secular and religious groups to pro-
vide such services.
Historic preservation ordinances should
also be reviewed. As a rule, such ordi-
nances should not allow landmark designa-
tion of the interior of a sanctuary without
consent of the religious institution and
should contain a "hardship" provision that
would apply to any designated structure.
Finally, local governments should make
sure that no religious denomination has
been singled out for either favorable or dis-
favorable treatment in the land use regula-
tory process, and that applications from
religious uses are treated no differently
than similar applications from secular uses.
Prevailing in a RLUIPA Case
As previously discussed, a local govern-
ment's likelihood of prevailing in a RLUIPA
case often depends on how broadly or nar-
rowly a court interprets RLUIPA. The cir-
cumstances of the dispute, however, are also
important. Local governments are in a rela-
tively strong position when they can
demonstrate that they treat churches fairly
as regards both the substantive and proce-
dural aspects of their land use regulations,
when they have no history of official ani-
mosity or discrimination towards churches
generally and the challenging church in par-
ticular, and when the challenged regulation
is based on a well-considered comprehen-
sive land use, growth management, environ-
mental protection, or historic preservation
plan. Other facts that are generally favorable
to local government include: when the
church is a "big-box church" or "mega-
church" that would have significant nega-
tive effects on neighboring properties; when
the church has a history of ignoring reason-
able land use regulations and/or violating
safety and building code provisions; or when
the church has refused to accept, or perhaps
even discuss, a reasonable compromise.
66. See, e.g., Evan M. Shapiro,
The Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act: An
Anay/sis Under the Commerce
Clause, 76 WASH. L. REv. 1255
(2001).
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